The IPCC dismissed natural climate change risks

The IPCC dismissed natural climate change in its climate forecasts and risk assessments provided to governments, in its Fifth Assessment Reports (AR5).[1],[2],[3],[4],[5] This means our governments have not mitigated potentially catastrophic natural climate change risks we are exposed to during this grand solar minimum and during the 21st century. These natural climate change risks include a climate switch to a global cooling, large magnitude volcanism, rapid climate change, and pandemic influenza.

When your government tells you that it “accepts the evidence for global warming by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5, 2014), and that this represents a global scientific consensus,” you need to know how dangerous such a statement is. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and IPCC Articles 1 and 2 are perilously dangerous to human survival and our global food security during this grand solar minimum.

Important IPCC disclosures relating to its climate forecasting inaccuracy and the dismissal of natural climate change risks:

1. In AR5 the IPCC projected that global temperatures will increase between 0.3⁰C and 0.7⁰C from 2016 to 2035.[6] Since 2016 the global and Northern Hemisphere temperatures declined by 0.21⁰C and 0.27⁰C[7] In 2018 Arctic glaciers continued their 6-year growth due to high levels of summer snow.[8] The Northern Hemisphere end of summer snow cover extent was 14.4 percent larger than the 1981-2010 average, building on a 7-year expansion trend.[9]
2. In AR5 the IPCC disclosed that 82 percent of its 1986-1998 promoted forecasts understated the temperature, and 97 percent of its 1998-2012 forecasts overstated the temperature, while missing the 15-year climate hiatus (1998-2012).[10] The climate hiatus occurred during a time when carbon dioxide (CO2) increased by 7.4 percent.[11] To manage this abysmal forecasting failure the IPCC suggested it reduce its forecasts by 10% percent, rather than refute its theory, even though carbon dioxide’s rise is well known to lag the temperature rise (i.e., ocean degassing).[12],[13],[14],[15],[16]
3. AR5 categorically dismissed natural climate change in its forecasts (solar activity,[17] volcanism,[18]) instead attributing 98% of climate change to human activity.[19]
4. To deliver four Representative Concentration Pathway scenarios of global warming,[20] the IPCC dismissed the next ice age by 30,000 years in AR4 without subjecting that hypothesis to peer review scrutiny.[21] This ice age delay theory is statistically and scientifically refutable (Chapter 2 of “Revolution: Ice Age Re-Entry”). The IPCC ignored, or dismissed, or did not review the expert opinions of leading solar-climate experts warning of Little Ice Age-like conditions during this grand solar minimum and in the decades ahead.[22],[23],[24],[25],[26],[27],[28],[29]
5. In AR5 the IPCC only assessed climate risks relevant to UNFCCC Article 2,[30] or theoretical climate risks the IPCC attributed to anthropogenic global warming.[31],[32] The IPCC dismissed (or failed to detail) natural climate change risks relevant to the stage of the glacial cycle that we exist in today (i.e., post-Holocene Climate Optimum period).
6. AR5 dismissed, or failed to review, or did not include coverage of the catastrophic climate change history of the Little Ice Age (13th to mid-19th centuries). This history included hundreds of years of successive famines and epidemics, [33],[34],[35][36],[37] and wars[38], linked to an ice age-like climate, severe and prolonged droughts, and the many climate-forcing volcanic eruptions that occurred during this period (See “Revolution: Ice Age Re-Entry” Figures 5.1-5.3).[39],[40],[41],[42],[43] A repeat of a Laki-like volcanic eruption (Iceland, 1783) during this grand solar minimum (i.e., a high risk period for large magnitude volcanism) would wipe out one year’s worth of food for one-third of the world’s population.[44] Half of all pandemics since 1500 were associated with grand solar minima, but this climate change risk was not reviewed adequately in AR5.
7. In AR5 the IPCC’s rapid climate change assessment did not review the civilization destroying impact of rapid climate change since the Holocene Climate Optimum (see point 8). Moreover, in 2012 the IPCC did not review the risk of abrupt or rapid climate change in its special report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.”[45] The post-climate optimum period is the most relevant period for assessing rapid or abrupt climate change risk, but this was not detailed in any IPCC risk assessment reports or report sections. Numerous rapid climate change events have taken place in the last 8,200 years, which destroyed many ancient civilizations.[46],[47],[48],[49],[50],[51],[52],[53],[54],[55]
8. AR5’s review of rapid or abrupt climate change was superficially restricted to three categories of events, which are not relevant to this stage of the glacial cycle that we exist in today. The IPCC’s superficial review included; (a) Dansgaard-Oeschger mini-ice age events that occur after the northern ice caps have formed and in the depths of an ice age.[56] (b) the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) collapse associated with the Laurentide ice sheet lake-dam burst.[57] This AMOC event took place during the melting of the last ice age’s ice cap, or prior to the Artic’s Holocene Climate Optimum and before re-accumulating 5,000 years of new ice build-up. The IPCC did not assess or did not detail the impact of volcanism on abrupt AMOC changes, which are known to help drive centennial-scale Arctic ice accumulation processes.[58],[59],[60],[61],[62] Instead the IPCC dismissed the prospect of climate forcing volcanic eruptions. (c) AR5’s theoretical discussion on climate system “tipping points” ultimately concluded an abrupt methane release event due to global warming (like happened 250 million years ago) will not occur during the 21st century.[63],[64]
9. The UNFCCC and IPCC Articles 1 and 2 installed the IPCC’s radiative forcing theory in 1998.[65],[66] A theory justifying correlation analysis supporting the carbon dioxide-temperature cause-and-effect relationship over all relevant timelines is conspicuously absent from all AR1-5 documents (1990-2014). Politically aligned government funded scientists, constrained by IPCC policy and procedures[67] reviewed science and risks relative to Articles 1 and 2. The InterAcademy Council independently reviewed the IPCC processes and procedures, and rebuked the IPCC for its scientific bias and its processes that enabled that bias.[68],[69] How can the IPCC’s radiative forcing theory represent an international consensus when its climate reviews were conducted by politically aligned government provided scientists (via short lists) relative to Articles 1 and 2, while dismissing, ignoring, or not detailing the marginalized climate science sub-fields that research the natural climate system? (i.e., solar activity, volcanism, geomagnetism, cosmic rays/low clouds, atmospheric-ocean circulations, natural greenhouse gases and aerosols).
10. A looming energy crisis is highlighted: AR5 reveals that we only have 50 and 70 years (in AR4 the IPCC say “decades”) of proven oil and gas reserves respectively,[70],[71] which is insufficient to produce the projected 21st century anthropogenic global warming. According to data from the USA’s Energy Information Agency there is only 50 years of proven oil and gas reserves, without factoring in any growth.[72] Meanwhile 50% and 70% of oil and gas reserves respectively are unproven guesstimates, including shale resources,[73],[74] while peak oil and gas discovery is history.[75],[76],[77],[78],[79]

The real agenda of Articles 1 and 2 is to help the United Nations (UN) switch the world’s energy system before we run out of proven oil and gas reserves in the decades ahead, and to implement the UN sustainable development goals. Instead of telling us the real reasons for switching to renewables and living sustainably, we are fear-mongered with this taxable anthropogenic global warming lie, which is poorly effective for inducing the energy system switch while inadvertently covering the natural climate change risks.

Has anyone read the United Nations Brundtland Report on sustainable development (Chapter 2: sub-Section 4: “Ensuring a sustainable level of population”)?[80]

One day during this 21st century grand solar minimum the world may awaken to the calamitous consequences of previously dismissed and unmitigated natural climate change risks. In the aftermath of such a catastrophe there will be a public inquiry and the above facts of disclosure will surface. The public will then see how contrived the anthropogenic global warming sham-science was, and that natural climate change risks were left unmitigated for decades because of Articles 1 and 2 and the IPCC’s bias-enabling procedures. The United Nations reputation will be destroyed, and that too of the academic climate science field that cozied up to governments for it’s funding. A widespread public revolution will take place because governments were party to this sham.

The consequence of a natural climate change catastrophe (unmitigated) will be to inadvertently allow nature to cull the human population. This potential human culling will be experienced in nations with little or no fossil fuel energy reserves (cold), in regions historically impacted by drought, in cities (no food production capability), and by nations without any pandemic flu vaccine manufacturing capability. Food crisis will ensue, and this will reverberate around the world for years afterwards. Those dismissed and unmitigated natural climate change risks will inadvertently achieve the Brundtland Report’s objectives of “Ensuring a sustainable level of population.”

The history of revolution during the Little Ice Age reminds us of what happens to governments when humans die en masse and cannot feed themselves.

Citations:

[1]       IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp.

[2]       IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages.

[3]       IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages.

[4]       IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Barros, V.R., C.B. Field, D.J. Dokken, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pages 688.

[5]       IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

[6]       IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 20, section E.1. This section summarizes the IPCC’s most recent climate forecasts.].

[7]       Global mean surface temperature data, commonly referred to as HadCRUT4. https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut4/data/current/download.html. [Exposé: Look at the bottom of the first column for the current year-to-date temperature. Subtract the 2018 from the 2016 data point to see the magnitude of the fall. Global Data: https://bit.ly/2nCgctz. Northern Hemisphere Data: https://bit.ly/2MRt75G, Southern Hemisphere Data: https://bit.ly/2nBfYTA. Tropics Data: https://bit.ly/2nFXJMM. [last downloaded 25/07/2018].

[8]       Polar Portal Season Report 2018. http://bit.ly/2UCuz0q.

[9]       National Centers for Environmental Information (USA). https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global-snow/201810.

[10]      Forecast inaccuracy: IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: (1) See page 61, Box TS.3. This section reviews the high degree of inaccuracy associated with IPCC-promoted climate forecasts. The IPCC tells us that 111 of its 114 forecasts (paragraph 2) were higher (i.e., over-forecasted) than the actual global mean surface temperature between 1998 and 2012 (HadCRUT4), and that nearly all their forecasts missed the 15-year hiatus in global warming during this time. (2) See page 61, Box TS.3. In the penultimate paragraph, we are told that 93 of 114 forecasts were below the actual global mean surface temperature (HadCRUT4) in the 15-year period prior to 1998. Despite 30 years of climate forecasting inaccuracies and missing the 15-year climate hiatus, the IPCC tells us it still has a “very high confidence” that its long-term forecasts are aligned with the real world data. (3) See page 62, Box TS.3. In the penultimate paragraph, a weak explanation is provided for this forecasting inaccuracy. The IPCC then suggests they should scale back their near-term forecasts by 10 percent. However, they admit this proposed down-scaling is still insufficient to account for the 15-year climate hiatus. In Box TS.3 the IPCC indicate the difference between forecasts and actual temperature could be due to internal climate variability, incorrect theory and model assumptions about radiative forcing, or model response errors (page 61 paragraph 2). The IPCC also tell us this inaccuracy could be linked to when the forecasting models were “initialized” relative to the real world phase of temperature oscillation or natural climate change. This latter point is tantamount to admitting that natural climate change is the cause of the promoted climate change, rather than carbon dioxide. The IPCC failed to explain that during the 15-year hiatus carbon dioxide increased by 7.4 percent. This continued rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels during the climate hiatus highlights a complete disconnect between the global mean air temperature and atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, and in fact disproves the IPCC’s radiative forcing theory.].

[11]      The carbon dioxide data (expressed as a mole fraction in dry air, micromol/mol, abbreviated as ppm) used to support this statement was provided by NASA (see link), which cited the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL). https://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/ghgases//CMIP5/CO2_OBS_1850-2005.lpl.

[12]         Ole Humlum et al., “The phase relation between atmospheric carbon dioxide and global temperature.” Global and Planetary Change. Volume 100, January 2013, 51-69.

[13]         Manfred Mudelsee, “The phase relations among atmospheric CO2 content, temperature and global ice volume over the past 420 ka.” Quaternary Science Reviews 20 (2001) 583-58.

[14]         Eric Monnin et al., “Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations over the Last Glacial Termination.” By Science 05 Jan 2001: 112-114.

[15]         N. Caillon et al., 2003, “Timing of atmospheric CO2 and Antarctic temperature changes across Termination III.” Science 299: 1728-1731.

[16]         H. Fischer et al., 1999, “Ice core records of atmospheric CO2 around the last three glacial terminations.” Science, 283, 1712-1714.

[17]         Dismissing solar activity. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: (1) See page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4. This point tells us that the IPCC climate projections assume no changes in solar irradiance in their climate forecasts, because there is a low confidence in the solar activity projections. (2) See page 1007 sub-section 11.3.6.2.2. The IPCC dismissed the impact of solar forcing on the climate during this grand solar minimum, despite solar activity being at its lowest level for the longest period since the early 20th century. This scientific dismissal of solar activity’s impact on the climate resulted from the low confidence the IPCC had in the solar activity projections (solar irradiance). But they had “high confidence” that greenhouse gases would offset any diminution in total solar irradiance’s impact on the climate. i.e., more confirmation bias. Who is the IPCC to dismiss NASA and Russian Space program physics?].

[18]         Dismissing volcanism. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: (1) See page 1008-1009, FAQ 11.2. This section details how volcanic eruptions impact the climate. We are told that IPCC-promoted climate predictions do not include or reflect potential future volcanic eruptions (for various reasons, which is tantamount to confirmation bias). (2) See page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4. This point confirms that IPCC promoted climate forecasts do not include any impact of volcanism on the future climate, because of volcanism’s unpredictability. By not including the potential impact of volcanism in climate forecasts, natural planetary cooling factors (i.e., volcanic aerosols) known to counter carbon dioxide’s global warming effect are thereby eliminated from IPCC promoted forecasts, thus overstating the temperature.].

[19]      IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 14, Figure SPM.5. This figure provides the IPCC’s radiative forcing contribution estimates and uncertainties (2011 versus 1750) for an array of factors involved in the IPCC’s version of climate change = 98% human contribution. Factors involved in natural climate change are not included in the IPCC’s theory and forecasts. These include, secular changes in solar activity (electromagnetism, magnetism), geomagnetism, cosmic rays and low clouds, volcanic aerosols, cloud formation at varying altitudes and latitudes, climate and ocean circulation systems, water vapor and carbon dioxide consequent to global warming (i.e., evapotranspiration, ocean degassing), etc.].

[20]         IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 79, Box TS.6. This blue, boxed text details the Representative Concentration Pathway global warming scenarios and the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 Models used to provide its global warming climate forecasts.].

[21]      Deferring the ice age 30,000 years. IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 996 pages [Exposé: See page 56, Box TS.6. This section details the influence of earth’s orbit of the sun on the onset of an ice age. We are told how the Milankovitch theory, associated with controlling ice ages, is a well-developed theory. It posits that minima of solar irradiance at high latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere enable snow to persist through the summer, which causes the ice sheets to expand. The IPCC tells us that global warming won’t be mitigated by changes in earth’s orbit (i.e., the orbits impact on decreasing solar irradiance), and that earth will not enter the next ice age for 30,000 years. More worrying, on page 85, section TS.6.2.4, it is re-emphasized that earth will not enter another ice age for 30,000 years or more, and that this was a “robust finding.” Critique: I am unable to find any peer-reviewed scientific publication for this IPCC ice age delay hypothesis. There is a statistical consequence in delaying the ice age by 30,000-years because this delay impacts the interglacial period duration, the inter-climate optimum interval, and global-to-Antarctica climate optimum phasing gaps relative to all other glacial cycles for the global, Antarctic and Arctic climate data.). This ice age delay hypothesis is being passed off as though it is a scientific fact, when in reality it is an unproven, non-peer reviewed, and readily falsifiable hypothesis (Book Chapter 2).].

[22]      N. Scafetta, “Multi-scale harmonic model for solar and climate cyclical variation throughout the Holocene based on Jupiter-Saturn tidal frequencies plus the 11-year solar dynamo cycle.” Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics (2012). doi:10.1016/j.jastp.2012.02.016.

[23]         Theodor Landscheidt, “New Little Ice Age Instead of Global Warming? Energy & Environment. 2003.” Volume 14, Issue 2, 327–350. https://doi.org/10.1260/095830503765184646.

[24]         R.J. Salvador, “A mathematical model of the sunspot cycle for the past 1000 years,” Pattern Recognition Physics, 1, 117-122, doi:10.5194/prp-1-117-2013, 2013.

[25]         Habibullo Abdussamatov, “Current Long-Term Negative Average Annual Energy Balance of the Earth Leads to the New Little Ice age.” Thermal Science. 2015 Supplement, Volume 19, S279-S288.

[26]      Jan-Erik Solheim, https://www.mwenb.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Blog-Jan-Erik-Solheim-def.pdf. Referred from http://www.climatedialogue.org/what-will-happen-during-a-new-maunder-minimum/. Citing blog for 4-5 solar-climate experts.

[27]      Boncho P. Bonev et al., “Long-Term Solar Variability and the Solar Cycle in the 21st Century.” The Astrophysical Journal, 605:L81–L84, April 10, 2004.

[28]      Nils-Axel Mörner, “Solar Minima, Earth’s rotation and Little Ice Ages in the past and in the future. The North Atlantic–European case.” Global and Planetary Change 72 (2010) 282–293. doi:10.1016/j.gloplacha.2010.01.004.

[29]      A. Mazzarella, “The 60-year solar modulation of global air temperature: the Earth’s rotation and atmospheric circulation connection.” Theoretical and Applied Climatology. 88, 193–199 (2007). DOI 10.1007/s00704-005-0219-z.

[30]      The narrow scope of the IPCC climate risk assessment was relative to Article 2 only: IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [Exposé: See pages 59-65, (1) Section B-1. The IPCC specifically tells us that key climate risks assessed relate to severe impacts relative to Article 2, which refers to dangerous human interference with the climate system. (2) See Table TS.3 and TS.3.].

[31]      IPCC assessed risks relative to Article 2: IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [Page 13. The IPCC predicts, with a high confidence, flooding due to sea level rise and increased storm surges. We are told that flooding, drought, and rain extremes will increase the risk of food insecurity, which will vary geographically. Drought is expected to impact water availability, with consequences on food production, water security, and on the survival of populations living in drought areas. Page 14. The IPCC tells us global risks will vary depending on the level of greenhouse gas emissions reached. Higher emissions are expected to exacerbate all risks identified, especially species extinctions, global food security, and normal human activities. We are told that risks will be substantially reduced under a low emission scenario.].

[32]      IPCC assessed risks relative to Article 2: IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pages [See page 13. The IPCC informs us of the likely loss of, or damage to, coastal ecosystems due to sea level rise and ocean acidification, which will lead to species extinctions and reduced biodiversity. See page 16. We are told that the displacement of people will increase, as will the risk of violent conflicts.].

[33]      David D. Zhang et al., “Global climate change, war, and population decline in recent human history.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences December, 2007, 104 (49) 19214-19219; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0703073104.

[34]      Dian Zhang et al., “Climate change, social unrest and dynastic transition in ancient China.” China Science Bulletin January, 2005, Volume 50, Issue 2, 137–144. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02897517

[35]      D. Collet and M. Schuh (eds.), “Famines During the ‘Little Ice Age’” (1300–1800), DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54337-6_2. [See page 21].

[36]      Anthony J. McMichael, “Insights from past millennia into climatic impacts on human health and survival.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences March, 2012, 109 (13) 4730-4737; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1120177109. [See page 4734, column 2, paragraph 2].

[37]      Geoffrey Parker, “Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered.” The American Historical Review, Volume 113, No. 4 (October, 2008), 1053-1079. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30223245.

[38]      The Little Ice Age’s impact on wars. IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [Exposé: (1) See page 772. According to the IPCC, because the exact causal pathways linking historical climate change to issues faced by societies of the past, i.e., wars during the Little Ice Age, no inference can be made for climate change on today’s global society. (2) See page 1001, section 18.4.5. This section details the IPCC’s low confidence in the historical data regarding the climate change link with wars. Critique: This exemplified confirmation bias. The same reasons used to dismiss the climate change risk associated with wars could be similarly cited for climate forecasting.].

[39]      J. Slawinska and A. Robock, 2018, “Impact of Volcanic Eruptions on Decadal to Centennial Fluctuations of Arctic Sea Ice Extent during the Last Millennium and on Initiation of the Little Ice Age.” J. Climate, 31, 2145–2167, https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-16-0498.1.

[40]      Clive Oppenheimer, “Climatic, environmental and human consequences of the largest known historic eruption: Tambora volcano (Indonesia) 1815.” Progress in Physical Geography: Earth and Environment (2003). Volume 27, Issue 2, 230 – 259. https://doi.org/10.1191/0309133303pp379ra.

[41]      Anthony J. McMichael, “Insights from past millennia into climatic impacts on human health and survival.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences March 2012, 109 (13) 4730-4737; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1120177109. [See page 4735, column 2, paragraph 2].

[42]      R.B. Stothers, “Climatic and Demographic Consequences of the Massive Volcanic Eruption of 1258.” Climatic Change (2000) 45: 361. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005523330643.

[43]      C. Oppenheimer, (2003). “Ice core and paleoclimate evidence for the timing and nature of the great mid‐13th century volcanic eruption.” International Journal of Climatology, 23: 417-426. doi:10.1002/joc.891.

[44]      Michael J. Puma et al., “Exploring the potential impacts of historic volcanic eruptions on the contemporary global food system.” Pages Magazine. Science Highlights. Volcanoes and Climate. Volume 23, No 2, December 2015.

[45]      Not detailing rapid climate change: IPCC, 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pages [Exposé and Critique: See page 122. The IPCC told us that it did not review the risk of abrupt or rapid climate change. This was despite this report being a Special Report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.” As you will see from the citations in this book, there is much published climate science and climate history relating to the Little Ice Age, climate-forcing volcanism, and the specific rapid climate events known to have taken place at or since the Holocene Climate Optimum i.e., the 8.2, 5.9 and 4.2 kiloyear rapid climate events (and other events). None of this risk-relevant information was detailed in this special risk report.].

[46]      P. Mayewski et al., (2004). “Holocene climate variability.” Quaternary Research, 62(3), 243-255. doi:10.1016/j.yqres.2004.07.001.

[47]      Bernhard Weninger et al., “The Impact of Rapid Climate Change on prehistoric societies during the Holocene in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Documenta Praehistorica XXXVI (2009). UDK 902(4-5)”631\637″>551.583.

[48]      M. Staubwasser, M. and H. Weiss, (2006). “Holocene Climate and Cultural Evolution in Late Prehistoric–Early Historic West Asia.” Quaternary Research, 66(3), 372-387. doi:10.1016/j.yqres.2006.09.001.

[49]      Robert K. Booth et al., “A severe centennial-scale drought in midcontinental North America 4200 years ago and apparent global linkages.” The Holocene. Volume 15, Issue 3, 321 – 328. 2005. https://doi.org/10.1191/0959683605hl825ft.

[50]      Stanley J. Krom et al., (2003), Short contribution: “Nile flow failure at the end of the Old Kingdom, Egypt: Strontium isotopic and petrologic evidence.” Geoarchaeology, 18: 395-402. doi:10.1002/gea.10065.

[51]      Ann Gibbons, “How the Akkadian Empire Was Hung Out to Dry.” Science August 20, 1993: Volume 261, Issue 5124, 985. DOI: 10.1126/science.261.5124.985.

[52]      Jianjun Wang, “The abrupt climate change near 4,400 year BP on the cultural transition in Yuchisi, China and its global linkage.” Scientific Reports | 6:27723 | DOI: 10.1038/srep27723. https://www.nature.com/articles/srep27723.pdf.

[53]      J. Wang et al., “The abrupt climate change near 4,400 year BP on the cultural transition in Yuchisi, China and its global linkage.” Scientific Reports 2016 Jun 10;6:27723. doi: 10.1038/srep27723.

[54]      Fenggui Liu and Zhaodong Feng, “A dramatic climatic transition at ~4000 cal. year BP and its cultural responses in Chinese cultural domains.” The Holocene. Volume 22, Issue 10, 1181–1197. April 12, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959683612441839.

[55]      A. Parker et al., (2006). “A Record of Holocene Climate Change from Lake Geochemical Analyses in Southeastern Arabia.” Quaternary Research, 66(3), 465-476. doi:10.1016/j.yqres.2006.07.001.

[56]      IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [See page 421].

[57]      IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; see Page 70, TFE.5, Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. With “high confidence” the IPCC asserts an abrupt transition of AMOC is very unlikely in the 21st century under its 4 climate scenarios (while ignoring volcanism’s potential impact).].

[58]      J. Slawinska and A. Robock, 2018, “Impact of Volcanic Eruptions on Decadal to Centennial Fluctuations of Arctic Sea Ice Extent during the Last Millennium and on Initiation of the Little Ice Age.” J. Climate, 31, 2145–2167, https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-16-0498.1.

[59]      F. Lehner et al., 2013, “Amplified inception of European Little Ice Age by sea ice–ocean–atmosphere feedbacks.” J. Climate, 26, 7586–7602. https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-12-00690.1.

[60]      C. Newhall et al., 2018, “Anticipating future Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) 7 eruptions and their chilling impacts.” Geosphere, v. 14, no. 2, p. 1–32, doi:10.1130/GES01513.1.

[61]      Odd Helge Otterå et al., “External forcing as a metronome for Atlantic multidecadal variability.” Nature Geoscience Volume 3, 688–694 (2010).

[62]      Y. Zhong et al., “Centennial-scale climate change from decadally-paced explosive volcanism: a coupled sea ice-ocean mechanism.” Climate Dynamics (2011) 37: 2373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0967-z.

[63]      IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [See page 1079].

[64]      IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; Page 70-71, TFE.5, Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. In a theoretic discussion focused only on methane release (from wetlands, permafrost, and ocean hydrates), we are told with “high confidence” that it is very unlikely that methane from clathrates will undergo catastrophic release during the 21st century.].

[65]         A restricted definition of climate change and its mitigation is enforced by Articles 1 and 2 (i.e., climate change blamed on humans, and anthropogenic global warming mitigation): United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations 1992. FCCC/INFORMAL/84, GE.05-62220 (E), 200705. [Exposé: See page 3 and 4 of the UNFCCC document for Article 1 and 2 definition of climate change and the mitigation objectives for climate change (respectively). Importantly, climate change is attributed to human activity, which changes the atmosphere, and which is in addition to natural climate change over the same period of time. This definition for climate change was present at the IPCC’s 1988 founding. In other words, the science of climate change was predetermined (human activity, greenhouse gases) and had nothing to do with an international scientific consensus. Article 2’s objective is focused on stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system, while ensuring food production and sustainable economic development. In other words, in 1988 Article 2 had already determined that human activity was dangerous and that it needed to be mitigated.]. Last accessed 08/10/2018.

[66]         Radiative Forcing Theory was installed in 1988 by Articles 1 and 2. Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (1990). Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group I. J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia 410 pages [Exposé: See the Preface of the IPCC’s first scientific assessment report. This preface tells us the IPCC was set up by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization and was given responsibility for assessing the scientific information relating to aspects of climate change, such as greenhouse gas emissions and the modification of Earth’s radiation balance caused by these emissions. The IPCC was also charged with evaluating the environmental, social, and economic consequences of climate change and proposing strategies for managing climate change. Critique: The IPCC’s radiative forcing theory was predetermined from the outset. There is no mention of assessing the scientific information relating to natural climate change and other mechanisms of climate control. Articles 1 and 2 caused this scientific bias, and IPCC procedures and processes have maintained it ever since.].

[67]      IPCC Procedures enabling its scientific bias: Conduct a Google Search for the following IPCC document. “Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports” or Appendix A to the Principles Governing IPCC Work Procedures. [Exposé: See Pages 5 and 16; IPCC author-scientists are selected from lists of national experts provided by governments. Pages 7 and 8; government representatives negotiate and agree to the final synthesis report wording line by line. Neither points support that AR1-5 represent a consensus of the international scientific community, but rather an enforced consensus by politically aligned government scientists receiving grant funding.].

[68]      Independent IPCC Review highlights the IPCC’s scientific bias and its procedures enabling that bias: InterAcademy Council. Climate Change Assessments. Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC. October 2010. ICommittee Review of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Report available at http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/. [Exposé: Page 18; Critiquing the IPCC’s “confirmation bias.” Page 14; Government provided and politically aligned scientists (grant funded). We are told that governments do not always put forward the names of the best climate scientist volunteers for the IPCC work. Political considerations are prioritized over scientific expertise and qualifications in the IPCC scientist selection process. Page 14; “Author selection” enables scientific bias. Co-chairs select lead and coordinating authors from a list of nominees provided by governments. Page 21; lack of independent review of AR1-4 arises because the working group co-chairs also select the review editors. Page 23; final synthesis reports are not written by independent expert scientists, but result from negotiations among government representatives and the IPCC chair and working group co-chairs. Page 24; line-by-line negotiation results in differences between the assessment reports and the final politicized synthesis report provided to governments.].

[69]         Craig D. Idso et al., “Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming.” The NIPCC Report on Scientific Consensus (non-International Panel on Climate Change). https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/Books/Why%20Scientists%20Disagree%20Second%20Edition%20with%20covers.pdf. [Key opinion leaders from marginalized climate science sub-fields and from within the radiative forcing field critique the IPCC science and projections].

[70]      Limited oil and gas reserves (AR5): IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. [Exposé: See page 379. The IPCC tells us that we have about 50 years of oil reserves and 70 years of natural gas reserves. They also confirm that energy discovery is more challenging and more costly, with a limited scope for profitable extraction of those reserves (i..e, extraction will require greater technology deployment). Question: How will humans generate the carbon dioxide required to produce the global warming predicted by the IPCC for the 21st century with only about 50 or so years of oil and gas left?].

[71]      Limited oil and gas reserves (AR4): IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. [Exposé: See page 265, section 4.3.1. This section details fossil fuels reserves, telling us the proven and probable oil and gas reserves will only last for decades, while coal will last for centuries.].

[72]      Data. 50 years of proven oil and gas reserves (see Chapter 8): Energy Information Administration data was obtained from: International Energy Statistics. These calculations utilized the following data files. Natural gas https://bit.ly/2LC6GBo, Crude Oil https://bit.ly/2IWeEaP, Coal data https://bit.ly/2L6pk3w. [Comment: Reserve timeline estimates are calculated by dividing the 2013 Energy Information Agency’s proven global oil, natural gas, and coal reserves by 2013 levels of production. This calculation tells us there are 50 years of proven oil and gas, and 130 years of coal reserves left. These reserve timeline estimates do not assume any population or economic growth, or a switch to a cold climate phase, which would accelerate energy demand.].

[73]      U.S. Energy Information Administration report. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources. An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States. June 2013. [Critique: See Table 2, page 3 for proven and unproven conventional and non-conventional energy reserves. The US Energy Information Agency reserve revisions mean that one-third of world gas and one-tenth of world oil resources are projections for shale resources. These revisions also mean that 50 percent and 70 percent of total conventional and unconventional oil and gas projections respectively are classified as unproven reserves (i.e., guesstimates). See pages 15-19, Methodology: These 2013 reserve revisions were based on predictions involving the application of historic US shale oil and gas recovery rates to foreign petroliferous basins with similar geophysical characteristics. These revisions assumed the same optimum operating context internationally as in the USA. See Chapter 8 of my book for a more detailed critique on this tenuous assumption.].

[74]      T.R. Klett et al., 2015, U.S. Geological Survey assessment of reserve growth outside of the United States: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2015–5091. http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/sir20155091. [Exposé: (1) See page 1; “The U.S. Geological Survey estimated volumes of potential additions to oil and gas reserves for the United States by reserve growth in discovered accumulations. These volumes were derived by using a new methodology developed by the U.S. Geological Survey.” (2) See page 4; Assessment of Reserve Growth Outside of the United States “Because recoverable volumes for individual reservoirs were not reported for many fields outside of the United States, the individual accumulation analysis was not used. Data acquired from individually analyzed U.S. accumulations were used as analogs in this study.” Critique: Significant increases in US fossil fuel reserves resulted from the deployment of new, non-validated forecasting methodology. Internationally, the reserve revisions were guesstimates, based on transferring historical precedents for the USA to overseas. None of these methods involved physically verifying the new reserves in the oil and gas wells or fields. That means these are unproven reserves].

[75]      All-time low for discovered resources in 2017: Around 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent was discovered. December 21, 2017. https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/all-time-low-discovered-resources-2017/.

[76]      Declining Reserve Replacement Ratios Deceiving In Resource Play Environment. November. 28, 2017. View Issue. Maurice Smith. JWN Energy. Daily Oil Bulletin. https://www.sproule.com/application/files/2415/1188/2978/Sproule-Declining-Reserve-Replacement-Ratios-Nora-Stewart-Steve-Golko.pdf.

[77]      Tom Whipple, Online article. “Peak Oil Review.” December 26, 2017. Originally published by ASPO-US. December 26, 2017. https://www.resilience.org/stories/2017-12-26/peak-oil-review-dec-26-2017/

[78]      Kjell Aleklett and Colin J. Campbell, “The peak and decline of world oil and gas production.” Minerals and Energy-Raw Materials Report 18.1 (2003): 5-20.

[79]      Ian Chapman, 2014, “The end of Peak Oil? Why this topic is still relevant despite recent denials.” Energy Policy, 64 . 93-101. http://insight.cumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/1708/.

[80]      The Brundtland Report “Our Common Future” was published in 1987 by the United Nations through the Oxford University Press. To view the report, click the link (http://www.sustainabledevelopment2015.org/AdvocacyToolkit/index.php/earth-summit-history/historical-documents/92-our-common-future). [Exposé: View Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development, sub-Section 4: “Ensuring a sustainable level of population.”].